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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CLOSE
CORPORATIONS: THE NEED FOR A
MODIFIED JUDICIAL APPROACH TO THE
REASONABLENESS TEST
The problem of compensating corporate executives reflects a
basic conflict of interest inherent in the nature of the modern corpora-
tion-the conflict between "absentee shareholders" and salaried
management.' Both in England and in America, the corporation has
historically been viewed as a vehicle whereby "skilled entrepreneurs"
employ large accumulations of capital for the benefit of "absentee
owners." 2 In the traditional view, both entrepreneurs and sharehold-
ers derived income from the enterprise only as a function of its pros-
perity. In the modern corporate setting, however, salaried executives
frequently receive generous compensation without regard to com-
mensurate corporate prosperity, often to the detriment of the inter-
ests of the "absentee owners." While this tendency is more readily
discernible in the publicly held corporation, where the divorce of
control from ownership is almost axiomatic,' similar patterns may
I. See Mautz & Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 474, 475 (1958).
The possibility of a diversity of interest among the participants in a corporation is noted in C.
ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE § 1.02, at 26 (2d ed. 1969). See also A. BERLE & G. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 112-14 (rev. ed. 1967); C. ROHRLICH,
LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 1-2 (1933).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS ARE USED IN THIS NOTE:
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER];
F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL];
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE (3d ed.
1962) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD].
2. See generally Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1375 (1956). This view, of course, is applicable primarily to the publicly
owned corporation; the small enterprise which becomes incorporated may have no "absentee
owners," since all stockholders are frequently managers who control the operation of the
enterprise.
For a treatment of the historical development of corporations in England and the United
States, see generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 11-17; 1 J. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A
STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR
RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1905); 1 FLETCHER §§ 1-2. See also I F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 486-511 (2d ed. 1898); Willis-
ton, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
3. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at xii-xxv, 112-16.
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also exist in the closely-held corporation, where the initial identity
of ownership and management frequently disintegrates.'
Before the advent of large, publicly held companies, dominant
directors were often able to manage corporate affairs without sub-
stantial reliance upon the expertise of highly-compensated officers.'
In this setting, executive compensation posed few problems, since the
dominant executives were also the directors. Corporate directors
were presumed to serve gratuitously, at least in their capacities as
directors, and looked to the increased value of their stockholdings
rather than to compensation for their financial rewards.' With the
evolution of the public-issue corporation and the rise of the highly-
salaried "outsider" executive, however, conflicts unavoidably arose
between absentee shareholders and salaried management over the
extent to which compensation of corporate executives intruded upon
an equitable return on the shareholder's investment. As a result,
widespread litigation ensued over the legality of allegedly excessive
compensation of corporate managers.7 In the majority of suits involv-
ing compensation patterns in both closely-held and public-issue cor-
porations, the courts have tended to employ the same judicial doc-
4. See generally 2 O'NEAL § 8.12, at 99; Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corpora-
tion-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1157 (1966); Sympos-
ium, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345, 375-84 (1957). See also Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a
Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271 (1970), noting that "break-
down occurs more frequently in close corporations than in other modes of business organization
because the participants usually have no easy way out." Id. at 271. Even if the minority
shareholder continues to serve as an officer, thereby retaining the identity of ownership and
management at least in theory, he may be able to exercise little or no control. See ROHRLICH,
supra note 1, at 210-Il.
5. See Mautz & Rock, supra note 1, at 476. See also BERLE & MEANS, supra note I, at 4.
6. See National Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 F. 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1899); Navco
Hardwood Co. v. Bass, 214 Ala. 553, 108 So. 452 (1925). See also H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 73 (rev. ed. 1946); 2 O'NEAL § 8.10, at 82. The principle underlying the rule
disallowing compensation to directors acting qua directors, in the absence of express provision
to the contrary, was that "the directors are trustees for the stockholders and the corporation,
and the law does not imply any promise to pay trustees for performing their duties as such
.... 5 FLETCHER § 2110, at 505 (emphasis added). See also Nashville Breeko Block & Tile
Co. v. Hopton, 29 Tenn. App. 394, 407, 196 S.W.2d 1010, 1016 (1946).
7. The events of 1929 and the ensuing Depression served as a catalyst for this onslaught of
shareholder litigation. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 848. One critical case in this regard
was Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933), in which a shareholder-plaintiff attacked a by-law
and amounts paid to the president and vice-president thereunder. See notes 49-52 infra and
accompanying text.
8. The tendency to utilize the same standard in both public-issue and close corporation
cases has continued despite the growing recognition of the structural and operational differences
between the two types of corporations. See generally I O'NEAL § 1.01, at 2; Bradley, supra
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trine.8 Invocation by courts of the "business judgment" rule,9 a
principle which entails judicial deference to directorial discretion
with respect to internal corporate affairs, has served to frustrate the
efforts of minority shareholders to limit excessive executive com-
pensation.
This Note will examine the general judicial response to efforts by
minority shareholders to limit allegedly excessive executive compen-
sation, while attempting to isolate the unique problems potentially
facing the unsalaried, minority shareholder in the close corporation.
Examination of the case law dealing with the problem of excessive
compensation indicates that an exaggerated judicial deference to the
business judgment of directors has precluded effective application of
an evolving reasonableness test to challenge compensation schemes."
Moreover, it seems apparent that the reasonableness test as actually
applied by the courts in compensation litigation manifests an undue
preoccupation with the executive's right to reasonable compensation.
The result of this emphasis is, in effect, to preclude due consideration
of the minority shareholder's right to a fair dividend return. In view
of certain situations unique to the close corporation, modified judicial
criteria are clearly needed in scrutinizing the reasonableness of execu-
tive compensation.
Non-Judicial Restraints on Executive Compensation: Inapplicability
to Close Corporations
While an analysis of the patterns of excessive compensation in
publicly held corporations is not within the scope of this discussion,
it should be observed that certain restraints, which are largely inap-
plicable to the close corporation, operate as a moderating influence
note 4; Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, 946; O'Neal,
Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 641 (1965).
9. See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 6, at § 63a; 3 FLETCHER § 1039, at 621-28. The
business judgment rule has been outlined as follows: "The basis of the rule is the wide latitude
that directors of a corporation are given in the management of the affairs of a corporation
provided always that [their] judgment, and that means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reason-
ably exercised by them." 3 FLETCHER § 1039, at 625. The rule has also been described as a
principle "of law which protects directors from liability for business decisions that are made
observing the standards of due care." Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 713 (E.D.
Pa. 1965). See also Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 75 (Del. Ch. 1969), citing Warshaw v. Calhoun,
221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. Ch. 1966), wherein it was held that "[iun the absence of a showing
of bad faith on the part of the directors or a gross abuse of discretion the business judgment of
the directors will not be interfered with by the courts."
10. See note 45 infra and accompanying text. See generally 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD
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on executive compensation in publicly held companies. Primarily,
public-issue corporations are subject to federal securities regulation,
including proxy rules requiring disclosure of certain compensation
schemes, such as stock option and group benefit plans. Where "insi-
der" trading pursuant to stock option plans produces short-swing
profits, executives and directors may be held liable to the corporation
for such illegal profits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12
Moreover, where executive compensation is inordinately high, disclo-
sure of the compensation scheme can possibly result in adverse pub-
licity for the corporation. 3 Similarly, unfavorable publicity may
attend the mere instigation of derivative actions attacking compensa-
tion plans in the case of the larger publicly held corporations, whose
interests in preserving a respectable public image can be expected to
provide at least a modicum of restraint upon the level of executive
compensation." In addition, the shareholder in a widely-held corpo-
ration who objects to compensation policy normally has the alterna-
tive of selling his shares on the open market at the prevailing price.,'
This "remedy" is largely unavailable to the close corporation share-
holder, whose shares are normally subject to strict restrictions on
transferability. 6 Moreover, even if the stock is legally transferable,
II. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-101, Items 7 & 9 (1972). See generally 2 WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD 832-37. It should also be noted that the issuance of stock pursuant to a stock
option or profit-sharing plan may require registration under section 5(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1972), inasmuch as the plan may contemplate a "public offering"
within the ambit of the 1933 Act, even though only the issuer's employees are the offerces. See
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). See generally 2
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1037-1132 (1961); 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 837-47.
A recent Supreme Court decision has granted judicial approval to the split-sale device, whereby
liability under § 16(b) can be partially avoided by disposing of one's holdings in two separate
transactions. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). See generally Note,
Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective Approach?, 58 VA. L. REv.
907 (1972). As a result, insider trading by executives or directors pursuant to stock option plans
may no longer result in such extensive liability if the split-sale device is employed.
13. Litigation or the possibility of litigation and, to a greater extent, sensitivity to
publicity resulting from disclosure requirements have probably brought down compensa-
tion levels, or at least kept compensation levels lower than they might otherwise have
been. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 921.
14. See id. 921; Comment, The Worth of a Man: A Study of Reasonable Compensation
in Close Corporations, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 269-70 (1965).
15. See Comment, Proposals to Help the Minority Stockholder Receive Fair Dividend
Treatment from the Closely Held Corporation, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 507-08 (1961). See also
Note, Arbitration as a Means of Settling Disputes Within Close Corporations, 63 COLUhI. L.
REV. 267 (1963).
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the shares may well have limited marketability. Finally, and again
resulting from the high liquidity of its stock, the publicly held cor-
poration is under far greater pressure to declare dividends at a con-
sistent rate than is the close corporation."
Whatever their efficacy with respect to publicly held companies,
these non-judicial restraints on levels of compensation have little or
no applicability to close corporations. Since stock in close enterprises
is not offered for public sale, federal securities regulations are largely
inapplicable to compensation schemes involving the issue and sale
of stock in closely-held corporations. Moreover, state statutory
regulation of executive compensation may be properly characterized
as more permissive than restrictive. For example, current statutes
tend to condone, or to authorize explicitly, the establishment of the
level of compensation for executive officers by a board of directors
which includes the officers whose salaries are to be fixed.'8
16. See generally ISRAELS, supra note 1, at §§ 4.03(2), 4.05; 2 O'NEAL § 7.01-.29. The
practical effect of restricting transferability is to grant "a veto on the admission of a new
partner." ISRAELS, supra, § 4.03(2), at 81. It should be noted, h6wever, that restrictions on
alienation are subject to the limitation of reasonableness. An absolute restraint on alienation
is invalid. 2 O'NEAL § 7.06, at 18; Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held
Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040, 1048 (1950). As to the meaning of "reasonableness" in the
context of restrictions on transferability, see Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283,
391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964).
A common form of restriction grants the corporation, the officers, directors, or sharehold-
ers a first option to purchase shares which a stockholder seeks to sell. For a recent case
sustaining a first option provision, see Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d
841 (Tex. 1972).
17. The declaration of dividends is an important factor in maintaining the stock's attrac-
tivenesg to investors:
[D]irectors of a large, public-issue corporation will normally find it desirable to
declare a regular dividend when profits are sufficient in order to keep their shareholders
satisfied and to assure a favorable market for their shares. Directors of a small, closely
held corporation, however, are often not interested in making their shares attractive to
corporate investors since they may prefer to raise capital through debt transactions in
order to perpetuate those presently in control . . . . [I]f the shareholder in a public issue
concern is dissatisfied, he can usually sell his shares for the prevailing market price and
exit as an owner of the corporation. Comment, Proposals to Help the Minority Stock-
holder Receive Fair Dividend Treatment from the Closely Held Corporation, supra note
15, at 507-08.
18. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.31 (1957), which provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or bylaws, the board of
directors, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors then in office, and
irrespective of any personal interest of any of its members, shall have the authority to
establish reasonable compensation of all directors for services to the corporation as
directors, officers or otherwise, or to delegate such authority to an appropriate
committee (emphasis added).
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In many close corporations, however, the salaried officers and
directors often constitute the total shareholder group, and excessive
compensation works to no one's disadvantage. t9 However, this ident-
ity of shareholders and management frequently breaks down. A dom-
inant faction on the board of directors may "squeeze out" a disfa-
vored director-officer from his salaried position,2 with the result that
the director must rely upon dividend returns for his income from the
enterprise. In addition, upon the death of a director-officer, his shares
may pass to his heirs, who typically do not participate in the active
management of the enterprise.2' A divergence of interests between
salaried officers-the active shareholders-and unsalaried, passive
shareholders is likely to lead to sharp conflict over compensation and
dividend policy. In such a conflict, the unsalaried, minority share-
holder is obviously at a distinct disadvantage. Not only is he largely
powerless to alter the corporation's policy, but the limited transfera-
bility of his shares may sharply curtail his ability to dispose of his
See also CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 820 (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (Supp,
1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13
(1963); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-30 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 1701.60 (Anderson 1964); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-10-33 (1953).
19. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 849, 851. See ISRAELS, supra note 1, § 4.02, at 79-80,
Note, Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1958).
Actually, the roles of shareholder, director, and officer are all normally filled by the same
persons in the close corporation. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 849.
20. See 2 O'NEAL § 8.12, at 99. See generally F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR
OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: "SQUEEZE-OUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES § 3.05
(1961). The classic case involving a squeeze-out of an officer-director is Carr v. Kimball, 153
App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y.S. 253 (Sup. Ct. 1912). In Carr, the president of the corporation
attempted to increase his salary and reduce the compensation of the secretary-treasurer, who
objected strenuously to both actions. The resulting dispute led to a scheme among the majority
stockholders, including the president, pursuant to which the secretary-treasurer was removed
from the board of directors. At a meeting of the reconstituted board, the secretary-treasurer,
who was a stockholder as well, was replaced. Until the institution of the action by the dismissed
officer, he was not employed by the corporation in any capacity. Indeed, the "directors excluded
[the plaintiff] from the employment of [the] company, from access to its place of business,
books, and records .... 9' Id. at 831, 139 N.Y.S. at 257. See also Lockley v. Robie, 276 App.
Div. 291, 94 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct.), modified and afl'd, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d 895 (1950).
21. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 20, §§ 2.03-.04, at 13-15. See also In re Radom &
Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. I, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) (where subsequent to a co-founder's death,
conflicts arose between the surviving founder, who managed the business by himself, and the
widow of the co-founder, who inherited her husband's stock interests); Connelly v. Weisfeld,
142 N.J. Eq. 406, 59 A.2d 869 (1948).
A method for avoiding this type of intra-corporate dispute is.the granting of an option to
purchase a decedent-stockholder's shares in the corporation. See ISRAELS, supra note 1,
at § 4.09.
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shares at a favorable price should he desire to do S0.22
Compensation of Officers or Dividends for Shareholders: The
Dilemma of Profit Distribution in Close Corporations
As a rule, most shares in a close corporation are owned by sala-
ried officers.23 These officer-shareholders invariably derive the bulk
of their income from the corporation in the form of compensation,
rather than from dividend returns.24 The reliance on dividends for
realization of income, which is characteristic of shareholders in pub-
licly held corporations, applies in the close corporation setting only
to the unsalaried shareholder,2 who may represent only a minority
interest.
The tendency by officers in the close corporation to rely upon
salary income, as opposed to dividend returns, is largely dictated by
tax considerations. 2 Declaration of dividends results in double taxa-
tion: profits from which dividends are declared are taxable as corpo-
rate income,27 and the cash dividends themselves are taxable to the
shareholders as personal income.21 In contrast, distributing profits
in the form of executive compensation results in a tax deduction to
the corporation to the extent that such compensation is deemed
"reasonable" by the Commissioner. 29 Therefore, salaried share-
holders in the close corporation can increase their return on total
22. See Comment, supra note 15, at 507-08. See generally 2 O'NEAL § 7.01-.29. Restric-
tions on transferability of stock tend to ensure that the corporation will remain "close" and
prevent the purchase of shares by parties which are unfriendly to the corporation. Id. § 7.02,
at 4. It should be observed in this regard, however, that an absolute restriction on the alienabil-
ity of shares will not likely be upheld. Id. § 7.06, at 18. See note 16 supra.
23. See I O'NEAL § 1.07, at 21.
24. Id. at 21-22.
25. 2 O'NEAL § 8.08, at 58.
26. See generally Alvarez, The Deductibility of Reasonable Compensation in the Close
Corporation, II SANTA CLARA LAWYER 20 (1970); Murdock, A Primer for Compensating
Executives in Closely-Held Corporations, 50 Cuu. B. REc. 146 (1968); Klaus, A Corporate
Quandary: Search for an Adequate Method of Executive Compensation, 4 TULSA L.J. 197
(1967).
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 11, 61, 63.
28. Id. § 61(a).
29. Id. § 162(a)(1). The section provides that a deduction shall be allowed for "a reasona-
ble allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered .. "
The test of deductibility is whether the compensation payments "are reasonable and are in fact
payments purely for services." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (1972). It is further provided that
"[a]ny amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of
services, is not deductible. An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of
a dividend on stock." Id. § 1.162-7(b)(1).
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investment by maximizing salary compensation at the expense of
dividend returns. 0 This compensation policy, however, may be in-
consistent with the interests of the unsalaried shareholder, who relies
upon dividends for his income from the corporation.
In addition to the economic factors militating against dividend
declaration in the close corporation, a formidable gauntlet of obsta-
cles stands between the unsalaried, minority shareholder and equita-
ble dividend treatment. Quite obviously, he is likely to receive little
sympathy from the board of directors, which is usually controlled by
the salaried officers whose economic interests lie in maximum com-
pensation and minimum dividends. As a minority shareholder, he is
typically powerless to oust individual directors, who invariably con-
trol enough shares to assure their incumbency.31 Moreover, restric-
tions on the transferability of close corporation stock may force the
objecting shareholder to sell at a low price, which is frequently deter-
mined by book value, to existing shareholders if he desires to with-
draw his investment.12 In such circumstances, recourse to litigation
may be the only viable alternative for the dissident shareholder.
A variety of judicial remedies is available to the minority share-
holder who seeks to restrain excessive executive compensation. De-
pending upon the circumstances, he may seek one or more of the
following forms of relief: an accounting;33 restoration of funds to
30. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 851. It is interesting to note that the smaller the
corporation, the larger is the relative magnitude of deductions taken for compensation. See
Taxation of Corporate Enterprise 35 (TNEC Monograph No. 9, 1941), cited in 2 WASHINGTON
& ROTHSCHILD 850. This phenomenon suggests that executives in larger corporations, who are
presumably in higher tax brackets, might choose to receive personal tax advantages by deferring
compensation which exceeds certain levels.
3 1. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 20, §§ 1.03, 5.08. Majority shareholder domination
of the election of directors can be partially thwarted where cumulative voting is in effect.
However, in many states cumulative voting is permissive rather than mandatory, which means
that cumulative voting will not be required unless provided for in the corporate charter. But
even where cumulative voting is mandatory, it may be circumvented by various devices, such
as reducing the size of the board. Id. § 5.08.
32. See 2 O'NEAL § 7.24a, at 86. The unsatisfactory nature of this method of price deter-
mination from the vendor's standpoint is that "[t]he book value of corporate assets [constitutes]
an unreliable guide to the true worth of a going business, and consequently the book value of
corporate shares is an unreliable standard by which to determine their worth." Id. For a listing
of other methods by which the sales price of restricted shares is determined, see id. § 7.24, at
84.
33. See. e.g., Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 828 (1947); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (Ch. 1961); Binz v.
St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); First Westchester Nat'l
Bank v. Olsen, 19 N.Y.2d 342, 227 N.E.2d 24, 280 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1967): Sandfield
v. Goldstein, 33 App. Div. 2d 376, 308 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Baker v. Cohn, 291 N.Y.
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the corporation;34 an injunction to prevent payment of excessive
salaries;35 damages;" limitations on in futuro compensation; 7 or
the declaration of a dividend.38 The shareholder may sue deriva-
tively,39 individually," or as the representative of a class.4 1 Yet, re-
gardless of the remedy which the minority shareholder seeks, he faces
formidable obstacles in obtaining judicial relief, inasmuch as courts
have been consistently reluctant to interfere with directorial discre-
tion as to what constitutes reasonable executive compensation.42
762, 52 N.E.2d 965, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d
623 (Ist Dep't 1943), aftid, 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
34. See, e.g., Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d
762 (7th Cir. 1959); Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972); Herald
Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152
Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 586 (1922); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
35. See, e.g., Teich v. National Castings Co., 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Nordin
v. Kaldenbaugh, 7 Ariz. App. 9, 435 P.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1967); Chambers v. Beaver-Advance
Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 140 A.2d 808 (1958). See also Rebell v. Muscat, 26 App. Div. 2d 685, 272
N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (stockholders are entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent
directors pendente lite from exercising certain stock options where the plaintiff-shareholders
demonstrated a sufficient probability of success in the litigation). See generally 5
FLETCHER § 2174, at 687.
36. See, e.g., Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958); Bermann v. Meth,
436 Pa. 88, 258 A.2d 521 (1969); Nordin v. Kaldenbaugh, 7 Ariz. App. 9, 435 P.2d 740 (Ct.
App. 1967); Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
37. See Trainor v. Berner, 334 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
38. See, e.g., In re Brantman, 244 F. 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1917); Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill.
549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897); Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 285 N.W. 809 (1939);
Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848
(Tex. 1955).
39. See, e.g., Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1972); Ruetz v.
Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Sandfield v. Goldstein, 33 App. Div. 2d 376,
308 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1970); Bermann v. Meth, 436 Pa. 88, 258 A.2d 521 (1969).
40. See, e.g., Teich v. National Castings Co., 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (individu-
ally and as a representative stockholder); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d
228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Baker v. Cohn, 291 N.Y. 762,52 N.E.2d 965,42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), modified, 266 App. Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1943), affd, 292 N.Y. 570,
54 N.E.2d 689 (1944); Murrell v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 239 N.E.2d
248 (C.P. 1968).
41. See, e.g., Teich v. National Castings Co., 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Chal-
verus v. Wilson Mfg. Corp., 212 Ga. 612, 94 S.E.2d 736 (1956); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles
Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y.S. 204 (3d Dep't 1930).
42. See, e.g., Teich v. National Castings Co., 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Gruber
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1958); Meiselman v. Eberstadt,
39 Del. Ch. 563, 568, 170 A.2d 720, 723 (1961); Sandfield v. Goldstein, 33 App. Div. 2d 376,
308 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1970); Murrell v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 8, 239
N.E.2d 248, 256 (C.P. 1968); Bermann v. Meth, 436 Pa. 88, 258 A.2d 521 (1969). See generally
2 O'NEAL § 8.12, at 101.
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The "Reasonableness" Test and the "Business Judgment" Rule
Notwithstanding the common law presumption that directors
served gratuitously, 3 in circumstances where a director served as an
officer under an agreement providing for remuneration, courts were
reluctant to tamper with whatever compensation level the directors
concluded was just.44 This historical judicial deference has largely
survived the transition of corporations from control by directors with
large stockholdings to management by "outsider" executives with
minimal stockholdings. When compensation plans have been at-
tacked, courts have consistently articulated and followed the tradi-
tional approach, premised upon the business judgment rule, whereby
good-faith execution of duties and the adherence to proper corporate
procedures by directors leaves little room for judicial review of execu-
tive compensation.45 On the other hand, instances of "self-dealing,"
whereby office-holding directors fixed their own compensation with-
out obtaining shareholder ratification, have consistently evoked judi-
cial intervention and appropriate relief. 6 In the same vein, courts
have not hesitated to strike down retroactive executive bonuses which
were not paid pursuant to a prior agreement between the corporation
and the executive on the grounds that such bonuses were unsupported
by consideration and therefore constituted a gift of corporate assets.47
43. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Church v. Harnit, 35 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1929); National Loan & Inv. Co. v.
Rockland Co., 94 F. 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1899); Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52,
67, 165 N.E. 889, 896 (1929); Rocky Mountain Powder Co. v. Hamlin, 73 Nev. 87, 310 P.2d
404 (1957). See generally Annot., 175 A.L.R. 554 (1948).
45. See, e.g., Gruber v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1958);
Sandfield v. Goldstein, 33 App. Div. 2d 376, 308 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1970); Heller v. Boylan, 29
N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (Sup. Ct.), affd without opinion, 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(1941); Murrell v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 10, 239 N.E.2d 248, 256 (C.P.
1968). See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 6, at § 76; 5 FLETCHER §§ 2122-33; Emerson &
Massey, Remuneration of Officers and Directors of Listed California, Florida, Ohio and
Virginia Corporations, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 156, 157 (1959).
46. See, e.g., Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959); Irwin v. West End Dev. Co.,
342 F. Supp. 687, 700-01 (D. Colo. 1972); Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp.
915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964). See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 6, at § 74; 2 O'NEAL § 8.12; 2 WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD 864-67.
47. See. e.g., Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 828 (1947); Spaeth v. Journal Printing Co., 139 F. Supp. 188, 191-92 (D. Alas. 1956);
Baker v. Cohn, 291 N.Y. 762, 52 N.E.2d 965, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified, 266
App. Div. 715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1943), affd, 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
Cf. Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527, 531, 218 A.2d 526, 530 (1966); Rocky
Mountain Powder Co. v. Hamlin, 73 Nev. 87, 91, 310 P.2d 404, 406 (1957).
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But not until the passage of federal securities laws, resulting in the
disclosure of theretofore closely-guarded compensation schemes in
large corporations, did the courts deal with the issue of the actual
amounts paid to corporate executives.48
Reasonable Compensation: The Lack of a Definitive Standard
The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Rogers v. Hill (The
American Tobacco Case)49 is generally regarded as the classic judicial
statement on the subject of executive compensation. 0 In holding that
certain executive bonuses based on increases in corporate earnings
should be reexamined and revised by the district court,51 the Court
indicated that where compensation "has no relation to the value of
services for which it is given" and, in effect, "amount[s] to spoliation
or waste of corporate property," the level of compensation cannot be
justified, even if shareholder ratification was obtained.5 2 Although the
opinion set forth the foundations of the reasonableness test, the Court
did not decide whether the bonuses involved in the cases were, in fact,
unreasonable. Moreover, the Court did not enunciate a definitive test
as to what constitutes "reasonable" compensation. Instead, the deci-
sion merely established a prerequisite to a showing of unreasonable
compensation-spoliation or waste of corporate assets. Similarly,
subsequent decisions dealing with the extent of executive compensa-
tion have failed to establish a definitive standard of reasonableness. 3
48. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 919. See notes II &12 supra and accompanying
text.
49. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
50. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 880-89. "Both because of the legal principles
established and the magnitude of the recovery, the first American Tobacco case remains the
leading decision upon the question of excessive compensation." Id. at 880.
5 1. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari after the Second Circuit's affirmance of the
federal district court's dismissal of plaintiff's bill on the merits. 62 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 289 U.S. 716 (1933). Federal jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship. The suit
was brought by a stockholder against the company's president and some of its vice-presidents
to force them to account to the corporation for allegedly excessive bonuses paid pursuant to a
scheme based on a percentage of corporate profits. Under the system, payments made to the
president of the corporation, including salary, bonus, and special cash credits, totaled over $1.2
million for the year 1930. Two of the vice-presidents received payments totaling over $500,000
in that year. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court. 289 U.S. 582
(1933). On remand, an order providing for retention of the bonus system, but restricting the
amounts to be paid in the future, was entered by consent, thereby terminating the case. 34 F.
Supp. 358 (1934). See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 880-83.
52. 289 U.S. at 591-92.
53. See, e.g., Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943);
Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Minn. 96, 285 N.W. 809 (1939); Heller v. Boylan, 29
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The judicial consensus as to what, in fact, constitutes "wasteful"
compensation has gone little beyond the recognition that it results
from
[fgailure to relate the amount of compensation to the needs of the particular
situation by any recognized business practices, honestly even though unwisely
adopted, [and from] bad faith or. . . a total neglect of or indifference to such
practices. .... 5.
Merely "excessive" compensation, resulting from the exercise of
"poor judgment," is distinguished from "wasteful" compensation
and is not regarded as unlawful or unreasonable.55
Instead of establishing precise criteria for review, the courts, in
addition to scrutinizing the method of compensation for irregularities
in the procedures followed in enacting the particular plan, have artic-
ulated a list of factors to which varying degrees of weight are ac-
corded in determining whether the amount of compensation consti-
tutes "waste" of corporate assets-that is, whether payments bear a
"reasonable relation to services rendered." Factors which the courts
have considered in this regard include: comparison of the compensa-
tion in question with remuneration of executives who have compara-
ble responsibilities in the same industry or within the company in
question; 6 the executive's previous earnings; 57 the success of the com-
pany during the executive's term of employment;" and the loss of
purchasing power resulting from inflation."9
Disparities in salary patterns with regard to such considerations
N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 704, 273 N.Y.S.
87, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
54. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D. Md. 1939), affd,
112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940).
55. Id.
56. See Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 568, 170 A.2d 720, 722-23 (1961); Ruetz
v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 112 N.Y.S.2d 431
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
57. See Heise v. Earnshaw Publications, 130 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1955); Jaffe v. Chicago
Warehouse Lumber Co., 4 Ill. App. 2d 415, 124 N.E.2d 618 (1954).
58. See Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972); Glenmore
Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d
624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
59. See Poutch v. National Foundry & Mach. Co., 147 Ky. 242, 143 S.W. 1003 (1912),
Riddle v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 147, 59 A.2d 599 (1948). See also 2 WASHINGTON
& ROTHSCHILD 856-63. It is notable that all of these factors, with the exception of company
success, focus upon considerations relevant only to the salaried officers. As a response to the
complaint of a dissident shareholder, who is seeking more equitable dividend treatment, the
factors are virtually irrelevant.
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as the industry average compensation for a given managerial position
may not, in themselves, move a court to invalidate challenged com-
pensation." However, in situations where the defendant has the bur-
den of demonstrating the reasonableness of compensation because
self-dealing was involved, failure to relate the salaries at issue to such
comparative criteria may create a presumption of unreasonableness.6
Despite the incorporation of these factors into the basic reasona-
bleness test outlined in Rogers v. Hill, courts remain reluctant to
interfere with the business judgment of directors as to what consti-
tutes reasonable executive compensation.62 This judicial attitude is
accurately reflected in the much-quoted dicta of Justice Collins of the
Supreme Court of New York in a decision upholding a challenged
compensation scheme:
Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to grapple with these entangled
economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province.
Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by its
[sic] directors, with the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but
what is reasonable compensation for its officers is primarily for the stockhold-
ers. 3
In view of this judicial reluctance to interfere with the exercise of
business judgment by directors, courts have tended to require a show-
ing of fraud, bad faith, or a clear abuse of fiduciary duty before
invalidating excessive compensation. 4 Alternatively, where compen-
sation is so glaringly excessive as to dictate that relief be granted, the
courts have preferred to dispose of the cases on grounds of irregulari-
ties in corporate procedure.
60. See Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 568, 170 A.2d 720, 722-23 (1961) (com-
pensation which is somewhat more than average salaries in the industry held not "necessarily
excessive" when "there is no shocking disparity").
61. See Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (udgment for defendant
officers reversed since they had failed to demonstrate that their salaries were in line with salaries
of officers having similar duties in comparable companies of the same industry; additionally,
failure to pay dividends and lack of corporate success indicated that salaries were not reasona-
ble).
62. See, e.g., Gruber v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1957);
Murrell v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 10, 239 N.E.2d 248, 256 (C.P. 1968).
See also 2 O'NEAL § 8.12, at 101; 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 852; Note, JudicialAttitude
Towards Executive Compensation, 29 U. CIN. L. REV. 245-47 (1960).
63. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
64. Gruber v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593, 603 (N.D. Ohio 1958). See also
BALLANTINE, supra note 6, at § 76; Emerson & Massey, Remuneration of Officers and Direc-
tors of Listed California, Florida, Ohio and Virginia Corporations, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 156-
57 (1959).
65. See generally 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 852. Typical of the irregularities seized
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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMPENSATION IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS: THE
REQUIREMENT OF SELF-DEALING
Despite the unique opportunities for "oppression" of minority
shareholders existing in a close corporation,"5 the same judicial defer-
ence to the discretion of directors evident in cases involving publicly
held corporations largely precludes substantive review of compensa-
tion in the close corporation as well. 7 Reflecting this reluctance on
the part of the courts to scrutinize the amounts actually paid, the
same loosely defined reasonableness test has developed in the close
corporation cases.
In close corporation litigation, however, there appears to be an
additional barrier to a successful shareholder attack on excessive
compensation. A detailed survey by Washington and Rothschild of
67 cases where executive compensation was challenged in close corpo-
rations revealed 23 instances in which compensation was held to be
unreasonable.18 In all but one69 of the cases finding that compensation
was unreasonable, the decisions were based upon a determination
that the compensation had been "self-dealt"-that is, the salaried
executive served on the board of directors which approved his salary.
If self-dealing does not exist, however, the dissident shareholder bears
the burden of proving bad faith or negligent waste of corporate as-
sets.7" The Washington and Rothschild survey concluded that this
upon by the courts are self-dealing by directors in voting compensation for themselves as
officers; absence of consideration when retroactive bonuses are voted without prior agreement;
and miscalculation of bonuses tied to increases in corporate sales or profits. For a leading case
where erroneous calculation of the profits on which bonuses were based led to significant
overpayments and resulted in a court order that the executives refund the overpayments to the
company, see Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also Winkelman v.
General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
66. See generally O'NEAL & DERWI.N, supra note 20.
67. See 2 O'NEAL § 8.12, at 101. Professor O'Neal further observes:
Perhaps the courts' concern about usurping functions of the board is misplaced in
compensation cases arising out of close corporations, because close corporations seldom
if ever have independent and disinterested directors making the decisions on compensa-
tion . .. Id.
68. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 865-67.
69. See Dwight v. Williams, 25 Misc. 667, 55 N.Y.S. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1898), in which the
financial failure of the corporation had resulted in appointment of a receiver. The salaries
continued to be paid to executives under the receivership.
70. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 867. It is only when "self-dealing" is established that
the burden of proof shifts to the executives or directors to justify the payments. See Ruetz v.
Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378
S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). However, in view of the defendant-executive's greater access
to information relevant to a determination of reasonableness, it is at least arguable that he
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burden was virtually insurmountable. 71
By. imposing, in effect, a threshold requirement of self-dealing,
courts may be affording dominant executive groups in close corpora-
tions an opportunity to avoid meaningful judicial review of their
compensation practices, even if self-dealing is present. Although
"self-dealt" compensation is presumptively voidable, 2 if not void,73
the presumption may be rebutted by subsequent shareholder ratifica-
tion.74 Since the dominant executives in close corporations normally
constitute the majority shareholder group as well, ratification of the
directors' action is often a mere formality.75 To exacerbate the prob-
should bear the burden of proof in the first instance, as is the case in tax litigation where
deducted compensation is challenged by the Commissioner as unreasonable. See, e.g., Charles
McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336, 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Washington and
Rothschild's 67-case survey revealed 21 cases in which compensation was upheld as reasonable
where the defendant had the burden of proof because of self-dealing. 2 WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD 865-66. In light of this relative success, it would seem that permanently shifting
the burden of proof would not produce unduly harsh results.
71. Id. at 867.
72. See Moore v. Herrink, 77 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1935); Gallin v. National City Bank, 152
Misc. 679, 707, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 118 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
73. See Karns v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 Ariz. 466, 73 P.2d 104 (1937). See generally 2
O'NEAL § 8.10, at 83.
74. See 2 O'NEAL § 8.10, at 85.
75. The traditional rule has been that a contract between a director and his corporation
may be ratified at a shareholders' meeting at which the interested director votes as a share-
holder. See FLETCHER § 761, at 1069. This principle was articulated in the English case of
North-West Trans. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887) (Ont.), wherein it was held
that the majority vote of the shareholders, including the director who was interested in the
contract, must prevail unless the ratification was effected by improper or unfair means. The
distinction recognized by common law with respect to interested directors and interested share-
holders is related to the fact that a director acts in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the
corporation, whereas an ordinary shareholder is properly entitled to act out of self-interest. See
Smith v. Brown Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964). For cases upholding the
director's right to vote his shares at a stockholders' meeting on a matter in which he is
interested, see, e.g., Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d 231 (R.I. 1964); Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County
Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892). However, in contrast to the traditional approach, a
recent federal case, in purporting to apply state law, held that there can be no effective stock-
holder ratification of a fraudulent transaction of the directors where a majority of the shares
which are voted at the shareholders' meeting are held by those "interested" in the transaction.
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968). In Pappas, the court applied what it deemed
to be controlling New Jersey law, as stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. See Brundage
v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967). However, the Brundage case
involved a proposed merger between companies having common directors, a factor which the
defendants in the case expressly acknowledged as placing the burden of proof on the party
seeking to uphold the transaction. Id. at 476, 226 A.2d at 599. Indeed, Pappas itself similarly.
involved a basic corporate reorganization. The extraordinary nature of directors' decisions in
Brundage and Pappas, due to proposed radical changes in corporate structure, are clearly
distinguishable from the more routine decision-making with respect to compensation of execu-
tives.
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lem of maintaining control over executive compensation, an increas-
ing number of states have modified their corporation statutes to ex-
pressly authorize self-voted compensation in close corporations."
Furthermore, even where self-dealing is neither ratified by sharehold-
ers nor authorized by statute, it is not sufficient grounds per se for
invalidating compensation. Indeed, courts have not uncommonly
upheld precisely such compensation."
Traditional judicial hesitancy to interfere with the extent of execu-
tive compensation, and the consistent invocation of the business judg-
ment rule in refusing to examine substantively the reasonableness of
compensation policy, can perhaps best be explained by the absence
of any manageable criteria to apply in evaluating the amounts ac-
tually paid to corporate managers." Courts cannot reasonably be
expected to respond sympathetically to a plaintiff's mere allegation
that a given amount, even if substantial, is "unreasonable." Unu-
sually high compensation may be justified by unusual responsibilities
assumed or duties performed .7 And yet, where self-dealing, fraud, or
obvious oppression cannot be demonstrated, the dissident share-
holder usually lacks clear evidence upon which to base his claim that
compensation is excessive or wasteful. 0 Comparison with compensa-
tion paid other executives has been largely unavailing due to the great
variations in company size and duties performed by officers of similar
classification, even within the same industry."
Reference to the corporation's relative prosperity, or lack thereof,
during the executive's term of employment is more likely to evoke
judicial response, 2 but such intervention almost invariably is trig-
gered by a finding that self-dealing was involved. 3 Moreover, favor-
76. See statutes cited at note 18 supra.
77. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941), where the court recited
typical reasons for refusing to declare compensation unreasonable:
It is not timidity, however, which perturbs me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for
revising these figures were I inclined to do so. No blueprints are furnished. The elements
to be weighed are incalculable; the imponderables, manifold. Id. at 679.
79. See Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 568, 170 A.2d 720, 723 (1961).
80. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 852-63.
81. See id. at 856-57.
82. See, e.g., Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687,701 (D. Colo. 1972); Glenmore
Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915, 919 (E.D. N.Y. 1967); Ruetz v. Topping, 453
S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). See also 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 857-59.
83. For instance, in several cases involving "self-dealing," the lack of relative corporate
prosperity was cited as a factor in invalidating compensation. See, e.g., Irwin v. West End Dev.
Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972); Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F.
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able case precedents are of limited utility with respect to executive
compensation, due to the unique nature of each corporate situation. 4
Obviously, adoption of a novel approach is dictated if dissident share-
holders are to successfully challenge executive compensation.
Although more current compensation cases reveal only limited
departures from traditional rules of review, the recent decisions occa-
sionally demonstrate that the business judgment principle is not in-
violable.85 For example, judicial hesitancy to interfere with internal
.corporate affairs was overcome in the case of Berkwitz v.
Humphrey."8 In striking down a profit-sharing and retirement plan
which was based on valid consideration 7 and passed by a disinter-
ested board of directors, the court reached a result which demon-
strated that mere adherence to proper corporate procedures in adopt-
ing compensation plans would not insulate such plans from judicial
scrutiny. Since the court found that the compensation plan included
post-retirement awards which were tied to increases in the market
value of the company's stock subsequent to the employee's retire-
ment, the scheme was declared "unreasonable per se" since it bore
no logical relationship to services rendered by employees participat-
ing in the plan.88 As a result, the court concluded that promulgation
of the plan constituted, in effect, a gift of corporate funds.89
Although litigation concerning compensation schemes subsequent
to Berkwitz has not been characterized by a fundamental departure
from the business judgment rule, certain results at least suggest that
where generous compensation of corporate executives results in re-
strictive dividend policies by the corporation, the courts will be less
Supp. 915, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Mo. Ct. App.
1970). See also 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 864-67.
84. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 924.
85. See, e.g., Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959); Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315
F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970); Glenmore Distilleries Co. v. Seideman, 267 F. Supp. 915
(E.D.N.Y. 1967); Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958); Ruetz v. Topping,
453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Mann v. Luke, 272 App. Div. 19, 68 N.Y.S.2d 313
(1947).
86. 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
87. The executives involved in the plan were required to remain in the company's employ-
ment subsequent to the execution of the agreement as a condition of eligibility for the benefits.
Id. at 89.
88. Id. at 90-93.
89. Id. at 90-93. The response to the case was not one of unanimous approval. See Lieber-
man v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1959). See also 72 HARV. L. REv. 375 (1958),
which, like Lieberman, rejected the reasoning of Berkwitz.
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willing to defer to directorial discretion." A notable case illustrating
this tendency is Santarelli v. Katz." In Santarelli, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the trial court's dismissal of a derivative action, in which the
plaintiffs alleged the existence of excessive executive compensation in
a family-controlled close corporation, primarily on the basis of unau-
thorized self-dealing. However, as further justification for reversal,
the court suggested that the defendants' "complete control" of the
corporation might well have resulted in unfair dividend treatment for
minority shareholders.12 In doing so, the court articulated a persua-
sive rationale for penetrating the business judgment rule:
Normally, a stockholder bringing a derivative suit against the management of
a corporation carries a heavy burden. Courts are properly reluctant to interfere
in corporate matters that are traditionally regarded as being within the ambit
of "business judgment." However, if a stockholder is being unjustly deprived
of dividends that should be his, a court of equity will not permit management
to cloak itself in the immunity of the business judgment rule . 3
The rationale advanced in Santarelli, with its suggestion that the
business judgment rule does not justify compensation practices which
result in improper denial of dividends, has rarely been applied by the
courts as sufficient grounds for invalidating compensation. The pau-
city of dividend declarations may be combined with other relevant
factors, however, to convince the court that compensation is unrea-
sonable. 4 Nonetheless, the prevalent approach of the courts in re-
90. Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1959); Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F.
Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970). For
earlier cases to the same effect, see Stearns v. Dudley, 76 N.Y.S.2d 106, 127-28 (Sup. Ct.),
aff d, 86 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 1948); Mann v. Luke, 44 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 272 App. Div. 19, 26 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1947), settlement approved, 82 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup,
Ct. 1948); Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159, 166-67 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified, 266 App. Div.
715, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1943), aff d, 292 N.Y. 570, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944).
91. 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959). The Santarelli case involved a broad attack upon the
management of a close corporation in which misappropriation of corporate assets and diversion
of corporate opportunities were alleged by a minority shareholder trust beneficiary. The allega-
tions involving excessive compensation centered upon annual payments averaging $11,375 per
year made to the wife of the chairman of the board of directors of the corporation. The wife
of the chairman was also a director, and her "services rendered" to the corporation consisted
largely of attending "three or four conventions a year." The court of appeals reversed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint and directed that, on remand, the burden would be
on the defendants to show the reasonableness of their self-determined compensation. Id. at 768-
69.
92. Id. at 768.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F. Supp. 497, 503 (D. Colo. 1970), where the court
stated: "[N]or is it permissible by payment of excessive salaries or allowances to divert funds
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viewing executive compensation still requires little more than refrain-
ing from obvious waste in order to avoid liability for excessive com-
pensation. Thus, in a case involving fees paid an investment adviser
in a mutual fund, a Delaware court indicated that
[w]here waste of corporate assets is alleged, the court, notwithstanding inde-
pendent shareholder ratification, must examine the facts . . . [This] exami-
nation is limited solely to discovering whether what the corporation has re-
ceived is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary sound business
judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid."
Where self-dealing does not exist, the courts' hesitancy to apply
substantive judicial review continues to prevail in the close corpora-
tion compensation cases as well. The. broad discretion which the
courts allow the board of directors in fixing the levels of executive
compensation is suggested by the rationale advanced in a recent Ohio
decision, which upheld a challenged compensation plan in a close
corporation:
The amount of compensation to be paid an officer is within the business
discretion of the company's board of directors, having regard to the volume
and nature of the business, and the courts are loathe to interfere, even though
the amount may appear to be in excess of the value of services rendered."
This limited extent of judicial review of executive compensation
patterns is clearly inadequate to protect the interests of the minority
shareholder in the close corporation. Adherence to the business judg-
ment and reasonableness standards places a virtually insurmountable
burden of proof upon dissident shareholders in cases where they can-
not establish self-dealing. 7 Moreover, various devices are available
to the dominant group in the close corporation by which the issue of
self-dealing can be negated. 8 Invocation of the business judgment
rule will, therefore, continue to preclude relief in the vast majority
of compensation cases unless manageable judicial criteria can be
developed for use in substantive review.
Rather than focusing narrowly on the excessiveness of amounts
actually paid as compensation, a method which inevitably comes into
from stockholders to officers or directors, without lawful reason." See also Ruetz v. Topping,
453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970), where questionable dividend policies were cited as one
of several reasons for invalidating a compensation plan.
95. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962) (emphasis added).
96. Murrel v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 10, 239 N.E.2d 248, 256 (C.P.
1968) (emphasis added).
97. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
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conflict with the business judgment rule, litigants challenging a com-
pensatory scheme might well emphasize the extent to which the plan
intrudes upon the shareholder's right to a reasonable return on his
investment. As suggested by the reasoning of Santarelli v. Katz, this
type of alternative approach may afford the courts a justification for
piercing the business judgment rule and broadening the scope of the
reasonableness test.
A NEW STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS: FOCUSING ON THE
SHAREHOLDER'S CLAIM TO AN INVESTMENT RETURN
A possible solution to the problem of providing adequate judicial
review of executive compensation can be extracted from a line of
recent tax cases where the reasonableness of compensation for tax
purposes was in issue.9"
Quite naturally, tax considerations are an integral part of corpo-
rate compensation planning, ' especially in the close corporation,
where compensation often constitutes the primary channel for distrib-
uting corporate profits. ' ' Since a deduction from a corporation's
gross income is allowed for reasonable amounts expended for com-
pensation, ' 2 the issue of the reasonableness of deducted compensa-
tion is frequently before the tax courts."0 3 Although the test of rea-
sonableness applied in the tax cases is roughly similar to that applied
in the corporate compensation cases, the tax cases are rarely cited in
the corporate law setting.'"4 Significantly, the test of reasonableness
applied by the tax courts10 5 is more comprehensive than the standard
99. See, e.g., Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970);
Irby Constr. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Northlich, Stolley, Inc. v.
United States, 368 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
100. For an analysis of the tax aspects of executive compensation in the close corporation,
as well as practical suggestions for dealing with such problems, see Murdock, supra note 26,
at 146.
101. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 849.
102. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
103. See sources listed at note 26 supra.
104. See 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 871-73. But see Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d
624, 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970), where the court explicitly referred to the tax test of "reasonable-
ness" in the course of its opinion.
105. It should be noted that the tax courts must, of necessity, determine whether compensa-
tion is reasonable inasmuch as a deduction is permitted by section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code only if the payments are "reasonable." Accordingly, in considering the reasonableness
of corporate compensation, the courts are attempting to implement the strong federal interest
in enforcing the tax laws. In contrast, suits instituted by minority shareholders attacking
compensation policies involve no equally direct governmental interest. Moreover, judicial scru-
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employed in the corporate setting."'
The test applied in the tax cases incorporates consideration of the
dividend treatment accorded shareholders in passing upon the reason-
ableness of compensation which is deducted by the corporation as an
ordinary business expense.107 Inclusion of the factor of the corpora-
tion's dividend policy as an integral part of the reasonableness test
distinguishes the tax cases from corporate cases, which have only
rarely considered dividend treatment in making a determination of
reasonableness. 10 More significantly, the tax cases have consistently
held that even where the challenged compensation may be technically
regarded as reasonable, salaries and other payments are not deducti-
ble to the extent that they represent corporate earnings properly
payable as dividends."'
The underlying rationale of this modified test of reasonableness
was set forth by the Court of Claims in Charles McCandless Tile
Service v. United States, °10 which involved the deductibility of execu-
tive compensation in a close corporation. In McCandless, the court
held that where an annual return on equity capital of 15 percent of
net corporate profits would have been reasonable and just,"' and
tiny of compensation patterns necessarily entails intrusion into intracorporate disputes, a factor
which necessarily involves overseeing of corporate decision-making. The general hesitance of
courts to interfere with business judgment of directors, which stems from a sense that the
judiciary is ill-equipped to operate as an ad hoc regulatory body over corporate decision-
making, applies in the compensation area as well. For these reasons, the approaches and
purposes of courts dealing with corporate compensation of executives differ in the tax and
corporate law contexts. Nevertheless, as will be indicated later, the methodology used by the
tax courts seems equally applicable in the corporate context. See notes 109-119 infra and
accompanying text.
106. See Murdock, supra note 26, at 146-47.
107. See cases cited at note 99 supra.
108. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Charles McCandless Tile Serv. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336, 1339 (Ct. C1.
1970); Northlich, Stolley, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 272 (1966); Irby Constr. Co. v. United
States, 290 F.2d 824 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.
339 (1957), affd, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 359 (1958); Barton-Gillet Co.,
70 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1970). It is at least arguable that compensation which is disallowed
as a deduction under the tax test should not be able to pass judicial scrutiny when challenged
in the corporate law setting. One leading commentator has even suggested that a by-law
provision for compulsory reimbursement of the corporation to the extent that compensation
fails the tax deduction test would not be inappropriate. See 2 O'NEAL § 8.13, at 109.
110. 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970). For a criticism of McCandless in the tax setting, see
Alvarez, supra note 26, at 31.
11l. The court's method in McCandless of determining the "reasonable and just" dividend
return is unclear. As a result, the McCandless approach is diminished somewhat in terms of
its usefulness to a shareholder who attempts to prove the actual extent of excessive compensa-
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where no dividend had been declared, purported compensation in the
form of salaries was not deductible by the corporation to the extent
that the payments represented a reasonable return on equity capi-
tal.112 In justifying its refusal to allow a deduction for otherwise rea-
sonable compensation, the court set forth the following rationale:
Implicit in our. . . discussion of reasonable compensation is the attitude that
a corporation's highly efficient operation and its clearly demonstrated profit-
making ability justify substantial compensation to the officers responsible
therefor. As such performancejustifies substantial compensation, we are of the
further view that it also justifies a substantial investment return."3
In applying this theory, the court held that, to the extent that the
compensation constituted a "disguised dividend," such payments
were non-deductible. 14
Inasmuch as due regard is given to whether there has been an
equitable return on investment capital, the theory advanced in
McCandless views executive compensation in a more realistic
perspective than the corporate test of reasonableness which has
evolved from Rogers v. Hill."5 Under the McCandless theory, a cor-
poration is required to make due allowance for dividend returns in
the same process whereby it calculates what is reasonable in fixing
executive compensation. This approach seems quite sound, for if the
corporation is allowed to fix a "reasonable" compensation figure
before it determines whether profits are sufficient to justify a divi-
dend, then profits may easily be consumed by merely denominating
an overly generous bonus as a "business expense.""' The company
tion. An approach which could be utilized by the courts would be to determine the appropriate
investment return in regard to the nature of the corporation's business-whether the enterprise
is "risky" or comparatively "safe." A lower return would perhaps be warranted if risk were at
a minimum than would be true if the enterprise was a high-risk venture. With this crude index
serving as a general guideline, the courts could then reasonably look to the dividend rates for
stock in public-issue enterprises involving a similar degree of risk for further guidance in
determining the precise amount of a reasonable dividend.
112. 422 F.2d at 1339-40. It should be noted that all of the stock of the corporation involved
in McCandless was owned by the two officer/directors whose compensation was being chal-
lenged for deductibility. Thus, there were no conflicting equities involved which would dictate
the court's overturning the company's dividend policies, other than the government's interest
in preventing tax avoidance. Nonetheless, the rationale applied by the court, in concluding that
what is reasonable compensation can only be determined in the context of the shareholder's
right to reasonable dividend treatment, seems equally applicable to cases where compensation
is challenged in the corporate law setting.
113. Id. at 1340 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
116. There is considerable merit in calculating the profits of a closely held enterprise prior
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could thereupon respond to a shareholder's complaint of unfair divi-
dend treatment by referring to the corporate ledgers and pleading
that profits .were insufficient to justify a declaration of dividends. If
the McCandless approach were applied to the corporate law setting,
however, an aggrieved shareholder could bring an action and require
the corporate directors to justify the discrepancy between the gener-
ous bonus and the dearth of dividends.
In contrast, under the loose standard of Rogers v. Hill, the busi-
.ness judgment rule would normally preclude this type of intensive
judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the corporate test of reasonableness fo-
cuses too narrowly on considerations relevant only to the salaried
executive, such as industry-wide or intra-company salary compari-
sons,117 while it fails to consider reasonableness from the perspective
of an appropriate investment return for the shareholder. Particularly
in the close corporation, where a dominant faction's interests often
lie in minimizing dividends for tax purposes, closer scrutiny of divi-
dend policy should be incorporated into the test of reasonableness of
executive compensation. Although expanded judicial review of a cor-
poration's dividend policy might well entail certain theoretical con-
flicts with the business judgment rule, the principle of judicial defer-
ence to directors' discretion is premised upon the theory that existing
standards of judicial review are too vague to justify an intrusion into
corporate decision-making. McCandless and similar tax cases dem-
onstrate that the determination of what constitutes equitable and
reasonable dividend treatment in a particular situation is not beyond
the purview of the courts.
CONCLUSION
Judicial review of challenged executive compensation plans has
characteristically displayed an exaggerated deference to the business
to allowing a deduction from profits for compensation paid to the corporate officers. Indeed,
one study indicates that "officers' compensation must be added back to reported earnings
before one can reach a fair idea of a small concern's profitability." 2 WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD 849, citing MERWIN, FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN MANUFACTUR-
ING CORPORATIONS 33 (TNEC Monograph No. 15, 1940). Obviously, this analysis should be
limited to a determination of the extent of profits from which dividends could be declared; the
pre-salary profit figure by no means should be construed as constituting gross income to the
corporation for tax purposes inasmuch as, by so doing, the benefits of section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code would be unavailable to the closely held concern. In short, the practice
of adding officers' salaries to corporate profits should be used only to determine the extent of
the fund potentially available for dividends.
117. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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judgment rule. Moreover, in those rare instances in which the actual
amounts of compensation have been reviewed as to reasonableness,
the test applied by the courts has focused too narrowly on factors
relevant only to the salaried officers. Thus, inadequate regard has
been accorded to the legitimate interests of the minority shareholder
in seeking an equitable return on his investment. In cases involving
close corporations, the consistently followed requirement of a thresh-
old demonstration of self-dealing effectively precludes review of chal-
lenged compensation in cases where self-dealing cannot be adequately
established or where the actionable nature of self-dealing has been
negated by statute or shareholder ratification. In view of the oppor-
tunities for oppressive dividend treatment of minority shareholders in
close corporations,"' it seems apparent that the tests generally ap-
plied by the courts in reviewing challenged compensation fail to pro-
vide adequate protection for the interests of an unsalaried, minority
shareholder. Since salaried executives dominating a close corporation
are in a position to maximize personal profit by enlarging compensa-
tion in derogation of dividend return, closer scrutiny of dividend
policy should be incorporated in judicial review of executive compen-
sation in the close corporation. Specifically, the courts should con-
sider to what extent, if any, an executive's compensation consumes
what may be regarded as a reasonable return on an unsalaried share-
holder's invested capital. To that extent, parties responsible for exces-
sive compensation should be required to repay the excess amounts to
the corporation, thereby creating a fund out of which dividends could
be declared."' The practicability of such a system of judicial review
is demonstrated by the recent tax cases, in which the disallowance of
tax deductions for ostensibly "reasonable" compensation has been
grounded upon explicit judicial findings of what constitutes a "just
and reasonable" dividend return in a particular case. Mechanical
invocation of the business judgment rule cannot justify inadequate
scrutiny of executive compensation when a manageable criterion for
review has been established.
118. See generally O'NWAL & DERWIN, supra note 20.
119. This solution was suggested 75 years ago by the Illinois Supreme Court. See Brown
v. DeYoung, 167 I11. 549, 556-58, 47 N.E. 863, 866 (1897).
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